A Brief History of the New Constitutionalism, or  How We Changed Everything so That Everything Would Remain the Same by Mandel, Michael
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Osgoode Digital Commons 
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
1998 
A Brief History of the New Constitutionalism, or "How We 
Changed Everything so That Everything Would Remain the Same" 
Michael Mandel 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Source Publication: 
Israel Law Review. Volume 32, Issue 2 (1998), p. 250-300. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Mandel, Michael. "A Brief History of the New Constitutionalism, or "How We Changed Everything so That 
Everything Would Remain the Same"." Israel Law Review 32.2 (1998): 250-300. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital 
Commons. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM,
OR "HOW WE CHANGED EVERYTHING SO THAT
EVERYTHING WOULD REMAIN THE SAME"
Michael Mandel*
Introduction: II gattopardo
The Italians have a word for what I want to say about modem
constitutionalism: "gattopardesco," that is "leopardesque", not as in the
animal but as in the novel The Leopard by Tomasi di Lampedusa. The
novel is about a noble Sicilian family at the time of the unification of
Italy in the mid-nineteenth century. Italian unification was mainly a
matter of the northern Savoy monarchy of Piemonte conquering the
peninsula and vanquishing the various other monarchs, princes, etc.,
including the Bourbon rulers of Sicily and Naples. But there were other
elements about and stirring up trouble, anti-monarchist and even so-
cialist elements. In a scene early in the novel, the Sicilian Prince of
Salina, the main character, is shocked to learn that his favourite nephew,
Tancredi Falconeri, is off to join the invading northerners. He remon-
strates with the boy:
You're crazy, my son. To go and put yourself with those people ... a
Falconeri must be with us, for the King.
To which the nephew answers:
For the King, certainly, but which King? If we're not there with them,
that bunch is going to make a republic on us. If we want everything
to remain the same, then everything is going to have to change. Have
I explained myself?'
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto; Visiting Professor,
Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The author wishes to thank
the Halbert Centre for Canadian Studies of the Hebrew University and the Faculty
of Law for their hospitality and support during the writing of this paper, and Karen
Golden Mandel for her helpful comments on an earlier draft. This paper is part of
a larger project generously supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Re-
search Council of Canada (Grant No. 410-94-1441), and the author is thankful for
that, too. This is a second in the series of articles on "Democracy and the Courts",
the first of which appeared in Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 3.
1 "Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga com', bisogna che tutto cambi" Giuseppe Tomasi di
Lampedusa, I Gattopardo, (Feltrinelli, 1994), 41.
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It seems to me that the new constitutionalism can best be understood
as one of those changes of everything so that everything would remain
the same.
What defines modern constitutionalism - what makes it "modern"
is the transformation in the relations between courts and representa-
tive institutions. The courts have been promoted from mere faithful
executors of the legislative will to the high status of more or less equal
protagonists. Representative institutions have been demoted from the
sovereign entities with legally unlimited power of the nineteenth cen-
tury and much of the twentieth to institutions hemmed in by legally
enforceable constitutional limitations, most characteristically found in
"rigid" Charters and Bills of Rights. These are enforced by judicial or
quasi-judicial bodies of every imaginable shape and size, national and
international tribunals that do not only enforce the law but actually
determine it. Montesquieu's fundamental distinction between legisla-
tures making and judges applying the law has become not only obsolete
but actually unintelligible. 2 The result has been a "legalization of poli-
tics" which increasingly moves the locus of political activity out of the
parliaments and into the courts. Look at the "World Map of Constitu-
tional Justice" so accommodatingly maintained on the Internet by the
Republic of Slovenia (of all places),3 and you will see a world almost
entirely populated by constitutional courts. Open any newspaper in the
industrialized world and you will see with almost depressing regularity
the same debates about whether these courts are doing law or politics,
2 "Again, there is no liberty, if the judicial power be not separated from the legislative
and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator ...
But though the tribunals ought not to be fixed, the judgments ought; and to such a
degree as to be ever conformable to the letter of the law ...
But as we have already observed, the national judges are no more than the mouth
that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating
either its force or rigor".
Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. by
Thomas Nugent (Hafner, 1949), Book XI.6, pp. 152, 153, 159.
3 httpJ/www.sigov.si/us/eus.map.html.
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with the losers inevitably crying "politics" and the courts inevitably
replying that they are just doing their legal duty.
4
We have come to regard this as a logical, almost necessary, feature
of "democratic" constitutions and, in a way, it is, because the more
democratic a constitution, in the sense that its representative institu-
tions are really representative and effective, the more likely we are to
find this modern form of constitutionalism. How far this identification
has gone can be gauged from the claim of Justice Aharon Barak,
President of the Supreme Court of Israel, that judicial review is the
"very essence of democracy".5
I want to argue that judicial review is not the essence but the opposite
of democracy, and not just in the familiar, definitional sense of unelected
judges overruling elected legislatures. In my view this is only a symp-
tom, though an important one, of the problem. I want to argue that the
new constitutionalism was intended to operate and does operate as an
antidote to democracy, that it was meant to preserve the oligarchy of
private property from the mortal danger posed by representative insti-
tutions elected by people without property, a.k.a. the demos. As long as
representative institutions were kept the personal possessions of the
rich, through limitations on suffrage and other devices, their constitu-
tional theorists sang the praises of parliamentary sovereignty. But the
moment the propertied classes lost control of these institutions, usually
as result of having to concede a broader suffrage, which meant handing
them over to their class enemies, these same constitutional theorists
started to worry about the "tyranny of the majority" the way they never
worried about the tyranny of the minority. They went to the drawing
4 For two recent examples: when the challenge to the introduction of the "Euro" before
the German Constitutional Court failed, the losing law professor claimed that the
decision was "highly political and opportunistic" and that "Germany is no longer a
law-based state": International Herald Tribune, April 3, 1998: 1, 12; and in a widely
reported speech to new judges, the President of the Supreme Court of Israel re-
sponded to critics by saying: "Those who argue that we should not hand down rulings
on issues with political implications don't understand what a court is", reiterating
his claim in United Mizrahi Bank (infra n. 5, at 162) that though "a constitutional
determination has political ramifications ... it is not made out of political considera-
tions" but rather considerations that are "legal-constitutional". Ha'aretz (English
edition), June 3, 1998: 3.
5 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd., et al. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, et al., (1995) 49(iv)
P.D. 221, opinion of the President of the Court, Justice Aharon Barak (in English
translation, at 121. All future references to this case cite the English translation).
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board and came back with judicial review. They changed everything
(namely constitutional theory) so that everything (namely the oligarchy
of the wealthy) would remain the same. They placed boundaries around
government action and called on the legal profession to police the
boundaries.
"Democracy" is clearly a contested term and I do not want anything
to turn on particular definitions of it. Indeed, the important thing is to
understand how radically the definition of democracy has changed as
part of modern constitutionalism. In my view, modern constitutionalism
was meant as an antidote to certain aspects of democracy which once
formed its conceptual core and still constitute its central appeal, but
which have been assigned to the distant periphery precisely as part of
this change to keep things the same.
In its original Greek sense, democracy meant "rule by the poor"6 or
"the mass of people who earn their own living".7 In C.B. MacPherson's
terms, democracy was "very much a class affair".8 Thus, while property
suffrage was the natural expression of oligarchy, democracy came to be
epitomized in the slogan "one person, one vote", to signify that the right
to full and equal participation was a condition, not of property, but of
sheer humanity.
The implications of this for property were enormous and the theorists
of the wealthy opposed democracy tooth and nail. For Aristotle, democ-
racy was a "perversion" because it had in view only the interests of "the
needy".9 Plato gave it this unflattering description:
6 Aristotle, Politica, Book III, Chapter 8 in R. McKeon, ed., Introduction to Aristotle
(Random House, 1947) 592-593:
"Oligarchy is when men of property have the government in their hands; democracy,
the opposite, when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers ... For
the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever
men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy,
and where the poor rule, that is a democracy. But as a fact the rich are few and the
poor many ... and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the oligarchical and
democratical parties respectively claim power in the state".
7 Plato, The Republic, Book VIII, H.D.P. Lee, trans. and ed. (Penguin Books, 1955) 338.
A very narrow notion of citizenship allowed Athenian "democracy" to exclude women
and slaves, constituting more than two-thirds of the adult population. See "Trans-
lator's Introduction" ibid., at 23. However, this evidently left enough room for class
conflict so as to horrify the property holders.
8 C.B. MacPherson, The Real World of Democracy (Clarendon Press, 1966) 5.
9 Supra, n. 6, Book III: 7, 592.
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Democracy originates when the poor win, kill or exile their oppo-
nents, and give the rest equal rights and opportunities of office ... [it]
treats all men as equal, whether they are equal or not ... The mass
of people, who earn their own living, take little interest in politics,
and aren't very well off... are the largest class in a democracy, and
once assembled are supreme.10
From these high-born Greeks in the employ of kings and tyrants,
through to the Philadelphia Convention of America's wealthiest, to very
near the end of the nineteenth century, democracy remained a dirty
word among respectable people. Only communists confidently called
themselves democrats." To reconcile democracy with inequality, its
theory and practice had to be radically transformed. If democracy was
to be admitted, yet property saved, then democracy had to be emptied
of its class content. The political and the economic had to be surgically
separated at the hip. Democracy could be allowed to play in the fields
of government so long as these were carefully delimited and government
did not overstep its bounds and interfere with the prerogatives of
property.
This is where modern constitutionalism came in, to draw a sharp line
between the political and the economic, to declare the economic a "pri-
vate sphere", despite the enormous social power wielded there, a realm
of "freedom", even though the only thing that was free was the exercise
of powerful and massively unequal market forces, and where, far from
being "free", each vote had to be bought in hard currency according to the
principle of "one dollar, one vote". The dismantling of the public sector
and the enormous concentration of completely unaccountable economic
power that characterizes our own era have made this clearer than ever.
If, according to the new vogue, all the important social decisions are to
be taken in the marketplace according to one-dollar-one-vote logic, and
all the dollars are in so few hands, how could we call ourselves "demo-
cratic" in any but the most creative sense of the word?12
10 Supra, n. 7, at 329, 331, 338.
11 E.g., Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, 1848 (Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1955) 31: "... the first step on the revolution by the working class is
to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to establish democracy".
12 This is not the place to parade the latest statistics on the vertiginous growth in
inequality of economic power, which nobody disputes anymore. Here is just one from
the United States as reported in the International Herald Tribune of March 2, 1998,
at p. 3: "The top 1% of Americans have more wealth than the bottom 90 percent, the
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So modem constitutionalism, I want to argue, is one of those changes
of everything to keep everything the same: in order to protect the
oligarchy of power in the face of the democratic transformation of
representative institutions, these institutions had to be constitutionally
restructured and forced to take on partners in the form of constitutional
courts that would make sure that they did not get carried away by
democracy.
In this paper, I am going to try and sketch a proof of this position by
confronting what seem to be typical modem defences of the democratic
character of judicial review. These defences have historical, empirical
and philosophical elements to them and I agree that a satisfactory
discussion has to cover all three points. Unfortunately, I cannot address
here in any serious way the very interesting and somewhat unusual case
of Israel itself, which is a shame, because this is the Israel Law Review,
after all; however, I discuss the case of Israel in detail in a companion
paper being prepared for delivery at a parallel conference in Jerusalem,
and perhaps the editors will see fit to publish it, if it is worthy, in a
future issue of the Review.
The "Lessons of History"
Cappelletti has called it "the mighty question of judicial review" and
Chief Justice Barak put it this way in his landmark decision United
Mizrahi Bank Ltd., et al. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, et al (1995):
Is it democratic that the court - whose judges are not elected by the
people and do not represent a social and political platform - be
empowered to invalidate a law enacted by elected officials?" 1
3
Though in my view this is an altogether too narrow definition of the
democratic question, it has nevertheless served as the starting point for
a spirited defence of modern constitutionalism that has taken on several
classic features. One is the re-definition of democracy itself so as not to
report [of the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation] says, placing the United States first
among industrialized nations when it comes to wealth inequality". For some Cana-
dian figures, see my The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada
(Thompson Educational Publishers, 2d ed., 1994) 337-340.
13 Supra n. 5, at 120.
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include deference to the majority. Ronald Dworkin is the champion
proponent of this point of view and we will confront him head on later.
But Dworkin himself says that, ultimately, the democratic character of
judicial review is an empirical question:
I see no alternative but to use a result-driven rather than a proce-
dural driven standard for deciding [the institutional questions]. The
best institutional structure is the one best calculated to produce the
best answers to the essentially moral question of what the democratic
conditions are, and to secure stable compliance with those condi-
tions. 14
I could not agree more. I also agree with Justice Barak's invocation
of Holmes' famous dictum that "a page of history is worth a volume of
logic". 15
What does history tell us?
History tells us that there is a strong connection between democracy
and judicial review. Just looking at our own half of this century, the
post-World War II era, judicial review appears always to be associated
in time with democratic developments. When Italy and the Federal
Republic of Germany went from Fascism and Nazism to government by
representative institutions elected by universal suffrage, they also in-
corporated "rigid" (legally binding, judicially enforced) constitutions
with Bills of Rights and judicial review. The same goes for Spain in the
1970s emerging from Fascism after the death of Franco. In the past
decade, the post-Soviet states moving out of the bureaucratic rule of the
nomenklatura all adopted judicial review, and when the Republic of
South Africa went from white minority rule to universal adult suffrage,
it did so under the auspices of a rigid constitution policed by a Consti-
tutional Court.
But it is clear that these facts cannot resolve the question of whether
judicial review is democratic, because they speak only of contemporane-
ity. They say nothing about why these phenomena have appeared
together in time. If, every time they hold Israeli-Palestinian peace
discussions in Washington, Prime Minister Netanyahu goes, this says
nothing about whether he goes to help or to hurt the peace process. The
14 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law. The Moral Reading of the American Constitution
(Harvard University Press, 1996) 34.
15 Supra n. 5, at 137, quoting New York Trust Co. v. Fisher 256 US 345 (1921), 349.
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question is whether in these historical situations, the phenomenon was
intended to operate and did operate as a part of or in opposition to the
tendencies underway. In other words we need to know the explanation
of the temporal relationship between judicial review and democracy.
The defenders of judicial review argue that it was added to repre-
sentative government to help democracy, to defend it against its en-
emies, to ensure its survival. Mauro Cappelletti advances this thesis in
"Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of 'Consti-
tutional Justice'":
The constitutional revolution ... occurred in Europe only with the
suffered acquisition of the awareness that a constitution and a con-
stitutional bill of rights need judicial machinery to be made effective.
The United States certainly provided an influential precedent. But
the most compelling lesson came from domestic experience, the ex-
perience of tyranny and oppression by a political power unchecked by
machinery both accessible to the victims of government abuse, and
capable of restraining such abuse. The lesson was eventually learned:
constitutional courts have been created, and constitutional processes
have been designed to make them work. ... Indeed, it seems that no
country in Europe, emerging from some form of undemocratic regime
or serious domestic strife, could find a better answer to the exigency
of reacting against, and possibly preventing the return of, past evils,
than to introduce constitutional justice into its new system of govern-
ment.
16
When Justice Aharon Barak staked out the claim for judicial review
in Israel, these same "lessons of history" figured prominently:
Israel is a constitutional democracy. We have now joined the commu-
nity of democratic countries (among them the United states, Canada,
Germany, Italy and South Africa) with constitutional bills of rights.
We have become part of the human rights revolution that character-
izes the second half of the twentieth century. The lessons of the
Second World War, and at their center the holocaust of the Jewish
16 Mauro Cappelletti, "Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of
'Constitutional Justice'", in Paul J. Kollmer and Joanne M. Olson, eds., The Judicial
Process in Comparative Perspective (Clarendon Press, 1989) 186-187, emphasis in
original.
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people, as well as the suppression of human rights in totalitarian




The fundamental values and basic human rights are so deep and so
important that the courts of various countries are prepared - with-
out any constitutional text - to negate parliamentary power to
impair those values. Indeed, in a number of nations with accepted
legal systems the recognition is slowly developing that certain fun-
damental values cannot be impaired by the legislature, even without
a written constitution. The bitter experience of Nazi Germany, inter
alia, has contributed to the understanding of this issue.,
And finally, citing Cappelletti:
One of the lessons of the Second World War was that constitutional
supremacy and judicial review of constitutionality are potent weap-
ons against the enemies of democracy. 19
How could the Second World War teach us such a lesson about
judicial review and democracy? What could have happened to show us
that judicial review would have been a "potent weapon"? There seem to
be two logical conditions: first, that judicial review was lacking where
the enemies of democracy triumphed and second, that this had some-
thing to do with their triumph. The standard claim for Germany goes
like this: the Hitlerites exploited the "flexibility" of the Weimar consti-
tution, which provided for unlimited governmental power, and they
were thus able to carry out their inhuman programme. using strictly
legal and constitutional means. Lacking appropriate constitutional
safeguards and imprisoned in a positivist legal philosophy that required
unflinching obedience to the law as enacted, there was nothing the
German judiciary could do but obey the legal government, no matter
how evil. When Nazism was finally defeated, to guard against anything
like such an eventuality recurring, the framers of the post-war consti-
17 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd., et al. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, et al., supra n. 5, at 1.
18 Ibid., at 80.
19 Ibid., at 111.
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tutions decided to shore up democracy by placing limitations on parlia-
ments through the enactment of rigid constitutions guaranteeing fun-
damental rights enforceable by judicial review.
Now I have read many more than one page of history on the Weimar
Republic and Hitler's Germany, and I cannot imagine how anyone who
has done the same could come to this conclusion.20 It simply bears no
relation to historical reality. If anything, the problem with the Weimar
Republic was an excess of judicial review, hindering the democratic
forces and helping the Nazis. Furthermore, apart altogether from judi-
cial review, the legal system had all the tools necessary to stop the Nazis
in their tracks, if only there had been the will on the part of its
operatives.
It is true that the German imperial judiciary, famous for its refusal
to admit any form of judicial discretion, much less judicial review,
survived the republican revolution of 1918 almost intact. But it was not
its "positivism" that was the problem, it was its arch political conserva-
tism, its antipathy not only for the reformism of the Social Democrats,
but for the Republic itself, whose governments were, for the first time
in German history, elected by universal adult suffrage.21 In fact, the
Weimar judges very quickly changed judicial philosophies to discover
judicial review powers that they had formerly denied themselves, using
the provisions of the Weimar Constitution (which said nothing either
way about the matter) to assiduously protect private property and
business interests, broadly interpreting rights against expropriation
and narrowly interpreting the right to strike, while ignoring the copious
social rights for which the constitution was famous. 22 A major turning
point occurred during the great inflation of 1923-24 when, having
reversed its jurisprudence to assist wealthy creditors, the Supreme
Court officially warned the government that it would not tolerate any
attempts to adjust debts in favour of debtors:
The strikingly revolutionary character of this declaration must have
been apparent to everyone familiar with the traditions of the German
20 Justice Barak cites no historians for his claims in United Mizrahi Bank on the lessons
of the Second World War, only the lawyers McWhinney, Cappelletti and BrewEr-
Carfas, ibid., at 111.
21 Henry W. Ehrmann, "Judicial Activism in a Divided Society: The Rule of Law in the
Weimar Republic", in John R. Schmidhauser, ed., Comparative Judicial Systems:
Changing Frontiers in Conceptual and Empirical Analysis (Butterworth, 1987).
22 Ibid., at 83-85.
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bench. For more than a century German judges had been trained to
honor unconditionally "the positive law". ... This sort of thing had
never occurred so long as Germany was a monarchy; the revolt of an
association of judges against the government of the King of Prussia
would have struck every German justice or professor as utterly
inconceivable. But against the Republic they dared to do so. Nor were
they restrained by the consideration that at this juncture the govern-
ment already had superhuman obstacles to contend with, the willful
increase of which should have given every German patriot good cause
to stop and think. So little could the German Republic trust its own
institutions of government!
23
But supporters of the Court realized that things had to be changed
if they were to remain the same:
... it is exactly in our democratic state, with an all-powerful parlia-
ment, that the pressing need is found for the existence of an authority
that will serve as a barrier against a transgression of the boundaries
for legislatures established in the constitution. 24
The German judiciarys died-in-the-wool political conservatism also
found expression in its handling of criminal cases. The courts were
notoriously easy on Nazi crimes and severe with the Left.25 Hitler
himself received an illegally light sentence at the Beer Hall Putsch trial,
and despite the fact that the defendants called the government a "Jew
government", the court lauded their "purely patriotic spirit and the
noblest of selfless intentions". Hitler served only six months for an
offence that carried a minimum five-year sentence. Though the law
required that, as an Austrian, he be deported, the court held: "in the case
of a man whose thoughts and feelings are as German as Hitler's, the
court is of the opinion that the intent and purpose of the law have no
23 Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic, Harlan P. Hanson and Robert G.L.
Waite, trans. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Vol. I, 1970) 287-288.
24 Quoted in F.F. Blachly and Miriam E. Oatman, "Judicial Review of Legislative Acts
in Germany", (1927), 21 Am. Pol. Science R. 113, at 117.
25 The bias gave rise to jokes such as the following:
There was shock when the Berlin judge sentenced the two Communists to only 5
years in prison for the crime of beating up an SA man. But the judge explained that,
though the crime was very grave, he had to take into account, as a mitigating factor,
that there was absolutely no evidence connecting the accused to the crime!
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application".28 The painful truth is that a simple application of the law
might have consigned Hitler to the dustbin of history. And when the
Nazis came to power, was it the judiciary's positivist scruples and
dedication to the faithful application of the law that allowed them to get
away with murder? Absolutely not. Jews were cheated like Shylock and
the law was overridden by the Nazi ideology. We were sentenced to
death for trumped-up love affairs with "Aryan" women under laws that
only punished habitual violent offenders with death. We lost all civil
rights to sue in contract and under labour and tenant protection legis-
lation, not because of the wording of the laws but against the wording
of the laws. As one judge said:
The question is not one which can be resolved through an interpre-
tation of the Tenant Protection Law, but is rather a question of
ideology. ... Terminating the leases of Jewish tenants is ... made
difficult by the Tenant Protection Law and in certain cases impossi-
ble. This stands in opposition to the necessity for ending all associa-
tions with Jews in the community as quickly as possible.
7
According to Miller, in his invaluable study, Hitler's Justice: The
Courts of the Third Reich:
Placing the judiciary under a strict obligation to follow the letter of
the law would have been an impediment to the "legal order" of the
Nazi regime and would have limited its power; for this reason, judges
were required to declare their loyalty to the Fuhrer rather than to
the law itself. Any appeal to the letter of the law was dismissed as
"moral and legal thinking typical of Jewish liberals".2
Muller argues that the myth of Weimar's "positivism" was actually
a post-war concoction ofjurists anxious to absolve themselves of respon-
sibility for Nazi crimes:
Although it was clear to every jurist during the Nazi era, and espe-
cially afterward, that National Socialist legal doctrines were the
26 Ingo Miller, Hitler's Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich, trans. by Deborah Lucas
Schneider (Harvard University Press, 1991) 15-16.
27 Ibid., at 118.
28 Ibid., at 220.
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exact opposite of legal positivism, the claim that judges and prosecu-
tors were merely following the laws and that, after all, this was how
they had been trained by their democratic professors during the
Weimar Republic became a blanket excuse ... Since the fairy tale of
positivism whitewashed the entire profession, it was seized upon
most gladly by those who should have been held responsible for the
crimes they had committed during the Nazi era, and the courts
readily accepted their self-justification. 29
Finally, what are we to make of the classic claim of the "constitution-
ality" of the means by which Hitler came to power?
To say that Hitler came to power legally is to beg the question. It is
safer to say that Hitler did not come to power unconstitutionally. The
means by which he became Chancellor of Germany, and by which the
National Socialist Party established itself as the only party in Ger-
many was strictly constitutional. 0
This position relies on the undisputed fact that, in taking power in
Germany, the Nazis observed the formalities of the Weimar constitu-
tion. On January 30, 1933, Hitler, as the leader of the largest party in
the Reichstag, was called to form a government by the President, who
also immediately gave him the authority to dissolve Parliament and call
new elections. These were set for March 5. On February 28, the day after
the Reichstag fire, Hitler used Article 48 of the constitution to have the
President declare a state of emergency and suspend civil rights. Under
the authority of the emergency decree, Hitler's political opponents were
arrested and their campaigning made impossible. After the election,
Hitler used the same decree to arrest the Communist opposition mem-
bers of the legislature. On the first re-convening of the Reichstag,
Hitler's proposal to amend the constitution and grant himself the ple-
nary powers with which he ruled thereafter was passed by the required
two-thirds vote of the required two-thirds quorum.
29 Ibid., at 220-222.
30 Ian Ward, Law, Philosophy & National Socialism (1992). The same claim is made
in H.W. Koch, A Constitutional History of Germany in the 19th and 20th Century,
(Longman, 1984), in which one can also find an unusually sympathetic treatment of
the German judiciary.
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Now it is clear that it is not to "beg the question" to say that all this
was illegal, because, whatever the terms of the decrees and the consti-
tution, the Nazis had no scruples about disregarding them. Their move-
ment had been based on criminal violence from the very start and this
did not cease with the taking of power. In fact, the SA storm-troopers
increased their terror under the protection of the government. Violent
attacks against the Left and even the Centre opposition (and the Jews,
of course) were central features of the election months of early 1933.
Concentration camps and prisons were filled to overflowing with politi-
cal opponents, whether or not their arrests came within the terms of the
decrees. The Enabling Act was passed with the 89 elected Communists
arrested and their seats empty. In his speech on the Bill, Hitler made
explicit threats to the deputies still not in concentration camps that he
would consider disapproval of the law "a declaration of resistance ...
war". And, of course, these were not the only acts of illegal violence by
the Nazi regime. The Gestapo arrested, imprisoned, tortured and mur-
dered opponents without any legal authorization and completely con-
trary to the laws on the books. Nor was there any legal authorization
for the Kristallnacht pogrom: not the 100 murders, not the destruction
of 200 synagogues and 1,000 stores, and not the arrest of 25,000 Jews
- all of this constituted violations of the criminal law for which the
entire leadership of the Third Reich could have been imprisoned for life
under the most flexible of constitutions, and certainly under the Weimar
constitution. "Nazism meant a regime of gangster government, of vi-
ciousness and violence".
31
Whether the clearly illegal violence, intimidation and unlawful ar-
rests undermined the "constitutionality" of the transfer of power is
perhaps slightly less clear, because it is uncertain whether the intimi-
dation is what caused the required majority of deputies to pass the
Enabling Act. But surely it would have been child's play for any judge
to declare at least the elections void on the basis of the brutal treatment
of the opposition. The Reichstag fire was obviously a fraudulent pretext.
Since "public security and order" were only "seriously disturbed or
endangered" by the government itself, the measures decreed were not
"necessary for their restoration", as required by Article 48. The decree
was not, therefore, permitted by the constitution. Not only that, the
31 Whitney R. Harris, Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg (1954) 57; Jost
DUlffer, Nazi Germany 1933-1945. Faith and Annihilation (Arnold, 1992) 142.
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terms of the Hitler decree, which basically suspended all legal rights,
went far beyond the terms of what Article 48 provided for. Finally, the
provisions on "equality" and "freedom of elections" (Articles 109 and
125) necessarily remained in force because they were exempt from the
operation of Article 48. So the constitution was violated by the Nazis'
discriminatory brutality against opposition parties, both in itself and
also because it was aimed precisely at destroying the freedom of the
elections of March 5 that were the basis of the Enabling Act.
In fact, it was only the "dangerous and unconvincing" interpretation
of Article 48 given by the Supreme Court during the Von Papen coup
against the Social Democratic government of Prussia in 1932, that gave
any constitutional plausibility at all to Hitler's decree of 1933.32 Nor did
the Court disavow adjudication in 1932; indeed, it declared part of the
decree (the least important part) unconstitutional.33 And this is the
main point: it was the exaltation of the constitution above the ordinary
law, a feature of rigid, not flexible constitutions, that allowed Hitler
even a veneer of legality, more importantly that allowed "the question"
of legality to be "begged", that is to be obscured, by arguments about
constitutionality .34
More or less the same lessons can be learned from the constitutional
experience with Fascism in Italy, where judicial review came in and out
of fashion with the political fortunes of the monarchy and the bourgeoi-
sie until Mussolini's accession to power. Only after the "March on Rome"
did the courts discover that they lacked the power to interfere, except
of course to interpret the law in accordance with the Duce's speeches.
Once again, Mussolini's resistible rise to power was criminal from start
to finish.35 If the judges were inclined to stop him, they had all the legal
tools they needed in the ordinary criminal law. Constitutional judicial
32 "The verdict has been found 'worthy of Solomon'. Yet such a comparison would have
been valid only if the wise monarch had really let the executioner hack the disputed
child in half". Eric Eyck, supra n. 23, Vol. II, at 421.
33 Ibid., at 410-425.
34 Of the many accounts of these events besides those already cited, see the discussions
in Richard Bessel, Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism: The Storm Troopers in
Eastern Germany 1925-1934 (Yale University Press, 1984); Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi
Germany: A New History (Constable, 1995); and the classic William L. Shirer, The
Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (Pan Books, 1964).
35 Alan Cassels, Fascist Italy (Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968); Dennis Mack Smith, Italy. A
Modern History, rev. ed. (University of Michigan Press, 1969).
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review would not have made, because it could not have made, the
slightest difference to the outcome.1
6
The Austrian case was slightly different, but the lessons are the
same. Thanks to the device of "concentrated" judicial review associated
with the Social Democrats' constitutional expert Hans Kelsen, the young
republic was able, for a time, to neutralize the reactionary judiciary by
reserving constitutional adjudication to a specialized tribunal and for-
bidding judicial review of constitutionality to the ordinary courts.
37
Furthermore, the court's constitutional jurisdiction was limited to ac-
tions brought by government 38 and judges were elected to the court by
the legislative assemblies. 39 Still, it must be said that even the original
constitution represented a defeat for the Social Democrats. According to
Kelsen himself, the Social Democrats were forced to abandon their plan
for a Weimar-type bill of social rights that would have separated Church
and State (in 1920 no one in Austria could foresee what the German
judiciary would do with the Weimar constitution), and to abandon as
well their stand against federalism (which was based on a well-founded
fear of the reactionary nature of the country-side):
... in 1920 it was the Christian-Socials and not the Social Democrats
who had to take greater account of the possibility of going into
opposition. The danger of a marked socialist regime was considered
then much greater than it is today. Therefore, that constitutional
provision which, in particular, benefits the opposition and which, for
changing the constitution, provides a majority of two-thirds, would
certainly have been claimed on the part of the bourgeoisie with the
greatest energy even though the Social-Democrats considered natu-
ral such an enhanced procedure as typical of every written constitu-
tion. This then signalled clearly that a simple socialist majority in
parliament would not have been able to abolish the constitutionally
36 See, in Italian, Guido Neppi Modona, Sciopero, potere politico e magistratura 1870-
1922, (Bari, 1969) and "La magistratura e il fascismo", in AA.VV. Fascismo e societ!
italiana (Torino, 1972). Some key decisions of the Cassazione are Lucernare c.
Ministero Lavori Pubblici, Giur. it., 1918, 1, 654; Curreri c. Abate, Giur. it., 1922, I,
1, 65; Nisco e Banco Di Napoli c. Enrietti, Giur. it., 1922, I, 1, 929 and Intaglietta
ricorrente, Giur. it., 1924, II, 1, 122.
37 Federal Constitutional Law of the Republic of Austria, 1920, Art. 89.
38 Ibid., Art. 140.
39 Ibid., Art. 147.
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guaranteed principle of private property and that a bourgeois minor-
ity of more than a third of the votes would have been enough to
defend the private capitalist system.4°
Though the court, with Kelsen's presence was able to exercise a
moderating influence on the notoriously reactionary ordinary courts,
this situation lasted only until 1929. 4 1 At that time access to the court
was expanded. Ordinary courts now had the right to refer individual
cases to the constitutional court on grounds of unconstitutionality of the
laws and "direct infringement of personal rights".4 2 These changes have
been celebrated as an advance in constitutional justice;43 but, in fact,
they were seen at the time and indeed operated as part of what Kelsen
called "the attempt of the bourgeois groups ... to restrain or even to
eliminate the parliamentary system".44 This is because the expansion of
the court's jurisdiction came at the same time as an authoritarian turn
in Austrian politics45 and was part of a package of constitutional amend-
ments that included the direct election of the President, who now had
emergency powers and the power of himself appointing the judges of the
Constitutional Court:
The reform of the Austrian constitution of 1929 was, not in the least,
directed against the Constitutional Court because of a conflict be-
tween the latter and the administration ... The old Court was, in fact,
dissolved and replaced by a new one almost all the members of which
were party followers of the Administration. This was the beginning
of a political evolution which inevitably had to lead to Fascism and
was responsible for the fact that the annexation of Austria by the
Nazis did not encounter any resistance.
46
40 Hans Kelsen, "The Forces for Reform" Neue Freie Presse, October 6, 1929 (transla-
tion).
41 Charles A. Gulick, Austria from Hapsburg to Hitler (University of California Press,
1948).
42 Federal Constitution Law of the Republic of Austria, 1929, Arts. 89.2, 140 and 140.1.
43 E.g., Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law (Cambridge
University Press, 1989) 195-196.
44 Supra n. 40.
45 In Austria, too, the judicial lenience on right-wing violence played an important part.
See Malbone R. Graham, Jr., "The Constitutional Crisis in Austria", (1930) 24 Am.
Pol. Science R. 144.
46 Hans Kelsen, "Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian
and American Constitution", (1942), 4 Journal of Politics 184, at 188; Federal
Constitutional Law of the Republic of Austria, 1929 Art. 147.
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The new constitutional court actively used its jurisdiction to help the
national government and its supporters harass "Red Vienna", but, of
course, this "effective" institution of judicial review was no "anathema"
to the tyrant and no more prevented the Dolfuss coup in Austria than
it did the Hitler coup in Germany.
47
Nor does it seem that there are any positive lessons to be learned
about judicial review from the experience of the Spanish Republic, the
third and final example of constitutional judging in Europe between the
wars. Once again, it appears that judicial review came at the insistence
of the conservative forces as a way of restraining the democratic, leftist
and anti-clerical thrust of the republic. 48 While the Tribunal of Consti-
tutional Guarantees was made elective to minimize its interference with
republican reform, by the time elections came around the country had
already swung to the right. The Tribunal was therefore a conservative
force in pre-Civil War politics. It is written of its 1934 decision against
Catalonian land reform:
... the court's decision was bound to be political rather than legal. On
June 8, by a 13 to 10 vote, without an absolute majority of the court
having heard the case, the Tribunal affirmed the objections of the
landlords. It was a vote in favour of centralism and conservative
vested interests against regionalism and land reform.
49
Obviously the presence of such "effective" judicial review did not
protect Spain from the Civil War and the Fascism that followed it and
endured for forty years.
To add to the "lessons of history" from pre-war Europe, we could point
to the cases where there was neither judicial review nor an authoritar-
ian takeover. France came dangerously close, but it was a popular
mobilization that saved the day, not a constitutional court.50 In Czecho-
slovakia, the failure to activate the constitutional court that was written
47 Gulick, supra n. 41. "This fact, that judicial review is anathema to the tyrant, is
confirmed by developments in many countries in several continents ...' Cappelletti,
supra n. 16, at 189.
48 Richard A.H. Robinson, The Origins of Franco's Spain: The Right, the Republic and
the Revolution, (David & Charles, 1970) 118.
49 Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War 1931-1939, (Princeton
University Press, 1965).
50 David Thomas, Democracy in France Since 1870 (Oxford University Press, 1969).
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into the constitution did not prevent it from surviving (unlike Germany,
Austria and Spain) with its representative institutions intact until the
German takeover in 1938.
So what are the lessons of the inter-war period?
First, that the lack of judicial review had nothing to do with the rise
of these dictatorships and their overthrow of democratic representative
institutions. In fact there was plenty of constitutional judicial activism
and it was employed by the enemies of democracy, first to thwart the
social reformism of the parliaments and then to help the anti-democrats
by interpreting the law according to higher law principles that merely
mirrored their authoritarianism.
Second, that it was not the jurisprudential theories of the judges but
their political sympathies which determined the results, as they adopted
doctrines of convenience (activism,. deference, etc.) to further their po-
litical causes, showing tolerance to right-wing violence and subversion,
intolerance for parliamentary reformism, and enthusiastic activism in
the defence of property. Inter-war constitutionalism changed everything
(constitutional theory and jurisprudence) so that everything (the oligar-
chical rule of private property) would remain the same. From this
historical record, it could only be predicted that judges, if given the
chance, would act the same way (that is, according to their political
sympathies) whatever the constitutional documents that they might be
called upon to "interpret" or the jurisprudential theories they might
claim to subscribe to.
Third, that constitutional "flexibility" (its inability to override ordi-
nary legislation) could have played no role whatever in the failure of the
judiciary to oppose authoritarianism, because from start to finish the
authoritarians used criminal violence to pursue their ends. A simple
application of the ordinary criminal law would have done the trick.
Where judicial authorities were unwilling or unable to do that, what
possible difference could the availability of rigid constitutional guaran-
tees have made?
Fourth, that the Kelsen-type concentrated system of judicial review
by a special, politically responsive tribunal was the least likely to hinder
democracy (because it was the least court-like and the least "independ-
ent"); but that, since it was such a direct emanation of the representa-
tive institutions, it could be only as democratic as they were. When these
institutions were occupied by authoritarian forces, the special tribunals
naturally followed suit.
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The true lessons of the inter-war period, that constitutional judicial
review is not only useless and unnecessary in the defence of democracy
but is actually a weapon in the hands of its enemies, were familiar to
all who lived through the period and survived to participate in the post-
war constitutional debates. It is these true lessons that best explain the
post-war developments and this is also the way it was understood by the
participants.
Take the example of Italy. In the period right after World War I, the
reformist movement, aided by the spread of the suffrage, made great
advances but was overthrown by the violent anti-democrats who were
then rewarded by the propertied classes by having the government
handed over to them. For the entire period from the unification of Italy
to the takeover of the Fascists, the doctrines of flexibility and rigidity
had gone in and out of fashion. But after the Fascist takeover, all the
conservative jurists chimed in with the self-serving doctrine that the
constitution provided no obstacle to what was being done. When, after
twenty-three years of dictatorship, the monster was overthrown and
universal suffrage finally triumphed, it was the conservative jurists who
now insisted on judicial review. The Left, adamant in its opposition,
knew how to read this, as these excerpts from the speeches of Pietro
Nenni (Secretary of the Socialist Party) and Palmiro Togliatti (Secretary
of the Communist Party) in the Constituent Assembly of 1947 show:
NENNI: One could say that the secret vice of this constitution is the
same one that can be found at every stage in our history, from the
Risorgimento on: distrust of the people, fear of the people and some-
times, terror of the people; the need to place between the expression
of the popular will and its execution as many obstacles, as many
diaphragms, as possible.
51
TOGLIATTI: All these provisions are inspired by fear: it is feared
that tomorrow there could be a majority that is the free and direct
expression of those working classes who want to change profoundly
the political, economic and social structure of the country; and for
that eventuality it is desired to have guarantees, to place impedi-
ments: from here the heaviness and the slowness of the legislative
process and all the rest; and from here that bizarre creature the
Constitutional Court, an organ that nobody understands and thanks
to the institution of which some illustrious citizens will be placed
51 Assemblea Costituente, March 10, 1947, at 324 (my translation).
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above all the assemblies and the whole system of Parliament and of
democracy, to be its judges.
5 2
Of course, to the post-war generation of Europe it was not only the
model of their own experience with judicial politics that made them
wary of judicial review, but above all the stable and enduring model of
the United States, in whose "camp" those countries adopting judicial
review after World War II were invariably to be found. Despite the
reputation for liberalism that the United States Supreme Court carved
out for itself in the twenty years from Brown v. Board of Education in
195453 to Roe v. Wade in 1973,m to the constitution-drafters of the
immediate post-war period it was an example of pure conservatism.
Everyone knew about Roosevelt's confrontation over the judicial attacks
on the New Deal; but this was only the death rattle of a court that had
been laying waste to social reform since the turn of the century.55
Edouard Lambert's famous The Government of Judges and the Struggle
against Social Legislation of 1921 used the American experience to warn
against the attempts of right-wing French jurists to introduce judicial
review to fight the workers' movement.56 American judicial conserva-
tism was also the model for the German judges in the 1920s when they
decided to stand up for property against democracy. 57
But the anti-democratic character of American constitutional judicial
review stretched back before the Lochner era through Plessy v. Ferguson5s
(the case establishing the "separate but equal" doctrine that lasted sixty
years before being overturned by Brown) and Dred Scott v. John F. A.
Sandford59 (establishing that slaves were property subject to the protec-
52 Ibid., at 330 (my translation).
53 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54 Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55 Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 251 (1918);
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture 259 U.S. 20 (1922) discussed in Stephen M. Griffin,
American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics, (Princeton University Press,
1996) 88-90. See also Russell Galloway, Justice For All? Rich and Poor in Supreme
Court History 1790-1990 (Carolina Academic Press, 1991).
56 Alec Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: the Constitutional Council in
Comparative Perspective, (Oxford University Press, 1992).
57 W. Simons, "Relation of the German Judiciary to Executive and Legislative Branches
of the Government Compared with that of the United States" (1929) 15 A B A Journal
762-67, 779; 54 A B A 226-42.
58 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
59 15 S. Ct. L. Ed. 691 (1857).
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tion of the Fifth Amendment), all the way to the very origins of the
constitution, which, when all the myths of history are stripped away,
amounted to a defence not of liberty but of property. This included the
fundamental right to property in slaves, which, in addition to the
implications of the guarantee of property rights, was explicitly en-
trenched by Art. I, sec. 9, which forbade Congress from abolishing the
import of slaves for a generation, and Art. IV, sec. 2 which obliged free
states to hand back fugitive slaves to their owners. So Cappelletti's
claim about judicial review being "anathema to the tyrant" was dead
wrong right out of the starting gate. 6° And slavery was just the most
egregious form of property that the constitution aimed to protect. The
framers of Philadelphia, fifty-five of America's richest men, drafted a
constitution aimed squarely at the "levelling" tendencies of state legis-
latures which, because of the demographics of American society (which
had similar suffrage restrictions to those in Europe but a different class
structure) were under the influence of a debt-ridden small-holding class
of farmers. 61 The state measures most hated were the various debt-relief
schemes which infringed the "private rights" of the wealthy creditors.
So, in the new American constitution, the states were deprived of the
power to "make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a tender in Payment
of Debts" or to "pass any.... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts
(Art. I, sec. 10). Alexander Hamilton could thus count for the success of
the constitution on "the good will of most men of property in the several
states who wish a government of the union able to protect them against
domestic violence and the depredations which the democratic spirit is
apt to make on property". 62 James Madison argued for
the necessity of providing more effectually for the security of private
rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with
these evils which had more perhaps than anything else, produced
this convention.... In all cases where a majority are united by a
common interest or passion the rights of the minority are in danger.6
60 Cappelletti, supra n. 16, at 189.
61 Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, A History of theAmerican Constitution, (West
Publishing Company, 1990) 16-17; Walter B. Mead, The United States Constitution:
Personalities, Principles and Issues, (University of South Carolina Press, 1987) 65.
62 Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States of America 1786-1870
(United States of America Department of State, Vol. IV, 1905) 288.
63 Kermit L. Hall, ed., Major Problems in American Constitutional History (Vol. I) 131.
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And though among his list of "sects, factions, & interests" he included
"inhabitants of this district or that district and the disciples of this
religious sect or that religious sect", the list was topped by "rich & poor,
debtors and creditors".6' 4 For the framers of the American Constitution,
the positions of dangerous majority and endangered minority were held
respectively by the same classes who held them in Aristotle's day and
in our own. The Amendments forming the famous Bill of Rights merely
ensured that the powers denied to the states to interfere with property
rights were also denied to the federal government.
So, while modern American scholarship tries hard to explain and
defend the anti-democratic sentiments of the framers of the American
constitution and their overwhelming concern for property rights, and
while it tries, as we shall see, to persuade us that these anti-democrats
somehow left us a fundamentally, indeed "essentially" democratic insti-
tution, it is no longer possible to deny that, as they saw it themselves,
these men aimed to devise a mechanism that would, while admitting it
in "form", provide a substantive "defence" against the threat democracy
posed to property.6
If we return to the constitutions of our era, we can see that the
inspiration for the move from parliamentary sovereignty to judicial
review pretty much always bears these hallmarks of an attempt to
protect property from democracy. For reasons of both time and space,66
I will have to limit myself to a few examples.
The European experience tends to confirm the gattopardesco thesis.
We have already discussed the Italian story which is a very clear case.
In West Germany, the situation is somewhat less clear because the
Social Democrats (though not the Communists) supported the establish-
ment of a Court. The Basic Law was drafted in the height of Cold War
hysteria, under the actual supervision of the American occupiers and
the tutelage of the virulently anti-communist Konrad Adenauer. The
64 Ibid.
65 Hence Madison's formulation of the need for a "defence agst. the inconveniences of
democracy consistent with the democratic form of Govt". ibid. See also Joyce Appleby,
"Capitalism, Liberalism, and the United States Constitution" in A-E. Dick Howard,
ed., The United States Constitution: Roots, Rights, and Responsibilities (Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1992) 61; Thornton Anderson, Creating the Constitution: The
Convention of 1787 and the First Congress, (Pennsylvania State University Press,
1993) 166ff.
66 Nobody's fault but my own!
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parliamentary commission that drafted the Basic Law in 1949 was
weighted in favour of the conservative parties. The Social Democrats
support for a Kelsen-type Court seems to have been as the lesser of
several evils, not unlike the attitude in Italy. And their fear of the
conservative majority's dominance meshed with the conservative par-
ties' desire to entrench property and federalism:
Christian Democrats would have at their disposal a powerful weapon
for protecting basic rights, particularly those of property and person-
ality. Social Democrats, traditionally distrustful of judicial review
and the regular judiciary, saw the Court as an equally powerful tool
in the protection of minority rights, especially the rights of minority
parliamentary parties. Finally, the states represented in the
Bundesrat envisioned the Court ... as a bulwark of German federal-
ism.67
The outnumbered Social Democrats were critical of the result and,
many did not regard it as "their" constitution." In fact, immediately
after the war, "higher law" principles became a fixture of conservative
German judicial thinking, both for the absolution this provided former
Nazis (who could claim the problem was really the legal philosophy of
"positivism" which, therefore, had to be replaced), but also for the
defence it provided against democratic change:
Merely by switching labels, large segments of the conservative world
view, formerly classed as part of the "way of life of the Volk", could
now be presented as "Christian natural law". Common to both was
a view of society as something static, an attitude that aimed at
preserving traditional values from democratic developments through
appeals to a status quo preordained in nature.6 9
In France, on the other hand, nothing could be clearer than the anti-
democratic character of the Conseil constitutionnel, enacted with De
Gaulle's 1958 constitution as just one more device to strengthen the
67 Donald P. Kommers, "The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political
System", (1994) 26 Comp. Pol. Studies 470, at 472.
68 Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany. Volume I: From
Shadow to Substance 1945-1963, (Basil Blackwell, 1989) 221.
69 Miller, supra n. 26, at 224.
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presidency at the expense of parliament, where the Left, though a
minority, was strong enough to make matters difficult for French capi-
talism. Intended for the first generation as a "watchdog on behalf of
executive supremacy" and a "cannon aimed at parliament" that con-
cerned itself only with jurisdictional questions and that could only be
invoked by the Presidents of the Republic, Assembly and Senate, its
jurisdiction was expanded in the nineteen-seventies to allow opposition
politicians to challenge legislation as an explicit precaution against the
eventuality of the Left coming to power.
70
In Canada, the Parliament that got out of hand was not a national
one but a provincial one. The Charter of Rights of 1982 was introduced
primarily to thwart the national aspirations of the French majority of
Quebec. When the Quebec provincial government started to exercise its
considerable sovereign legislative authority under the constitution of
1867 in a way that challenged English hegemony, the rest of Canada
decided it was time to change everything so that everything would
remain the same. The constitution was declared, for the first time in
history, to be amendable without Quebec's consent and sweeping con-
stitutional changes were introduced to overrule Quebec's language leg-
islation.7 1
An extreme case of a changing everything so that everything would
remain the same was the Chilean constitution of 1980. This replaced the
liberal constitution of 1925 with a document that guaranteed that Chile
would only return from the bloody dictatorship of General Agosto Pinochet
to democratic forms of government under a rigid constitutional
straightjacket. It guaranteed the presidency of Pinochet until 1990 and
his control of the armed forces until 1997. The authoritarian values he
wrote into the constitution, the rigid property and business rights and
the limitations on union activities were be safeguarded by supreme and
constitutional courts nominated by him or by institutions controlled by
him (e.g., the National Security Council) and an extremely difficult
amending process which left his hand-picked senators for life - a
position he himself took up he occupied his own life-seat in March 1998
- with enormous influence. 72 In this context the constitutional court
was just one of many "authoritarian enclaves".73
70 Stone, supra n. 56, "Constitutional Politics as Oppositional Politics".
71 Michael Mandel, supra n. 12, chaps. 1 and 2.
72 The Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile, 1980.
73 "Removing the Old Regime's 'Enclaves", Latin American Weekly Report, 11 March
1997, at 129.
[Is.L.R. Vol. 32
No. 2, 19981 BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 275
The constitutional revolutions of the 1990s in Eastern Europe pro-
vide striking examples of the relationship between democracy, property
and constitutionalism. Constitutional judicial review did not exist in the
Soviet period and neither did open elections or private property in the
means of production. Then, all of sudden, all three were introduced
together. The most interesting example is that of Russia itself.
The introduction of a constitutional court was hailed as a democratic
development and its independence from the government that appointed
it was cautiously praised.7 4 But then the 1993 showdown came. During
a confrontation between President Yeltsin and Parliament over eco-
nomic shock therapy (Yeltsin in favour and Parliament, like most of the
people, opposed), Yeltsin ordered Parliament's dissolution, admittedly
violating the constitution. 75 Surprisingly (given the historical record of
constitutional courts), the Constitutional Court sided with Parliament.
Yeltsin's response was to suspend the Constitutional Court and send in
the tanks. When the smoke had cleared and the funerals had been held,
Yeltsin unveiled a made-to-measure constitution, which reduced the
powers of Parliament and the regions and increased those of the Presi-
dent, granting himself broad and almost unlimited powers of decree and
of veto.76 The Constitutional Court was to be continued, but the number
of members was increased from 13 to 1977 to ensure a majority favour-
able to Yeltsin.7 8 In drafting the constitution, Yeltsin paid as close
attention to the American constitutional Right as he did to the American
economic Right in designing his economic programme. The constitution
provided very strong guarantees for business ("freedom of economic
activity"79 ) and protections for private property not unlike those in
Pinochet's 1980 constitution for Chile.8° Since the dissolution of the
74 Herman Schwartz, "The New East European Constitutional Courts", (1992) 13 Mich.
J. Int'l L. 741; Matthias Hartwig, "The Institutionalization of the Rule of Law: The
Establishment of Constitutional Courts in the Eastern European Countries", (1992)
7 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 449; Herbert Hausmaninger, "From the Soviet Committee
of Constitutional Supervision to the Russian Constitutional Court", (1992) 25 Cornell
Intl L.J. 305.
75 Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, trans. by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, (Random
House Inc., 1994) 242, 255.
76 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993, Arts. 90 and 107.
77 Ibid., Art. 125.
78 Robert Sharlet, "Russian Constitutional Crisis: Law and Politics Under Yeltsin",
(1993) 9 Post-Soviet Affairs 314, at 332.
79 Supra n. 76, Art. 8.
80 The Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile 1980, Art. 19(24).
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Soviet Union, American constitutionalists had been insisting that the
ex-socialist countries needed especially strong protection for private
property, just to get their folks into the habit.81 But there was much
disappointment at early drafts of constitutional protection for private
property. A 1992 draft provision dared to provide that "The exercise of
the right to property shall not contradict the common good". American
legal experts helpfully pointed out:
To improve these provisions, and to alleviate some of the fears of
potential foreign investors, the drafters will need to strengthen the
property owner's rights. This can be achieved by requiring "market
value" or "just" compensation in the event of the exercise of eminent
domain or other legal mechanisms aimed at the deprivation of pri-
vate property.8
2
Here is what Yeltsin's constitution of 1993 provided:
35 (1) The right to private property is protected by law.
(2) Everyone has the right to own property and to possess, use
and dispose of it either individually or in conjunction with other
persons.
(3) No one may be deprived of his or her property except by a
court decision. Property may be expropriated for state needs only
if equal-value compensation is provided in advance.
(4) The right of inheritance is guaranteed.
Though the constitution provided that it could be adopted by a bare
majority vote of a bare majority quorum, it would require two-thirds of
the legislators (and in some case three-fifths) or a referendum to amend.8
In a campaign whose rules guaranteed success, the constitution was
declared ratified even though the scholarly consensus is that the 50%
quorum was not achieved.84
81 Cass Sunstein, "Constitutionalism, Prosperity, Democracy: Transition in Eastern
Europe", (1991) 2 Constitutional Political Economy 371.
82 Mark Ellis, "Drafting Constitutions: Property Rights in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope", in "Symposium: Constitutionalism in the Post-Cold War Era", (1994) 19 Yale
J. Int'l L. 197-199.
83 Supra n. 76, Arts. 135 and 136.
84 The Toronto Star, May 29, 1994; Daniel Singer, "Yeltsin, the Lame-Duck Czar", The
Nation, May 2, 1994, at 588; Robert Sharlet, "Transitional Constitutionalism: Politics
and Law in the Second Russian Republic", (1996) 14 Wisconsin Int'l L.J. 495, at 496.
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One amazing aspect about the whole episode was the ease with which
the international community was able to discredit the constitution and
the court and to applaud Yeltsin's unconstitutional behaviour, just
because it advanced the cause of "economic reform", that is the resto-
ration of the brutalities of the "free" market. The parliament was
discredited as a bunch of Communist Party holdovers, even though their
pasts were no more tainted than that of Yeltsin himself and their
electoral pedigree was at least as strong as his;8 the court was con-
demned as "political" even though its reasoning was impeccable, and
"divided" even though the dissenters were few; the constitution was
described as a relic of the Communist past by Americans whose consti-
tution is a relic of the slave past.8 Though Yeltsin trampled underfoot
both representative institutions and constitutions (the old one and the
new one), democracy was once again redefined, this time as "market
reform", that is as capitalist economics pure and simple, so that the
world press could trumpet: "Democracy has triumphed in Russia".s7
As our last example, the recent birth of modern constitutionalism in
South Africa also provides very strong support for the anti-democratic
thesis. As with the Europe of the 19th century, the South Africa of the
20th (up until April 1994) excluded over 80% of the population from the
suffrage. But parliamentary sovereignty was strictly, indeed religiously,
adhered to (turn-of-the-century President Paul Kruger called judicial
review "a principle of the devil""). When the narrow suffrage of apart-
heid was replaced in April 1994 with universal suffrage, it was under
a new, "rigid" constitution, that is to say one not amendable by simple
majority, that included the institution of judicial review under a Bill of
Rights. 89
85 Stephen White, Ian McAllister and Olga Kryshtanovskaya, "El'tsin and his Voters:
Popular Support in the 1991 Russian Presidential Elections and After", (1994) 46
Europe-Asia Studies 285.
86 Richard Pipes, "The Last Gasp of Russia's Communists", New York Times, October
5, 1993, at A27; Owen M. Fiss, "Judiciary Panel: Introductory Remarks", in "Sym-
posium: Constitutionalism in the Post-Cold War Era", supra n. 82, at 1.
87 The Globe and Mail, December 13, 1993, at A2.
88 Charles Villa-Vilencio, "Whither South Africa?: Constitutionalism and Law-Making",
(1991), 40 Emory L.J. 141, at 150.
89 The amending formula requires a two-thirds vote in the National Assembly, and in
some cases seventy-five percent, as well as the support of six provinces: The Consti-
tution of the Republic of South Africa, sec. 74. The African National Congress polled
62.6% of the votes in the April 1994 elections: The Globe and Mail, May 7, 1994, p.
A16.
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There are a number of reasons to consider this yet more confirmation
of the anti-democratic thesis. In the first place, the idea for the Bill of
Rights came from the white minority who held on to a racist suffrage,
until the writing was on the wall, with every violent means at hand °
Nor was the struggle against the Apartheid regime only about voting
and legal segregation: it was about concrete economic and social in-
equality. South Africa was not only legally racist; it had one of the
world's worst situations of income inequality, with the white minority
earning on average about eight times the income of the black majority1
- roughly the difference between the richest 20% and the poorest 20%
of Canadians, only in South Africa it was the richest 13% and the
poorest 75%. Not only a monopoly of legal power, but a monopoly of
private property: 87% of the land and 95% of the productive capital, with
80% of the shares quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange being
held by four white conglomerates. This is what the whites tried to keep
the same while changing everything. They tried, in the words of Albie
Sachs (a white hero of the anti-apartheid movement who was maimed
in a murderous attack by South African authorities), to "privatize
apartheid" by making redistribution impossible through a classic prop-
erty-protecting Bill of Rights. According to Sachs:
The attack on majoritarianism, which underlies many arguments in
favour of a bill of rights, is manifestly racist, since South Africa has
been governed without a bill of rights and in accordance with the
principles of majority rule (for the minority!) since the Union of South
Africa was created in 1910. It is only now that the majority promises
to be black, that constitutional doubts and the need for checks and
balances suddenly become allegedly self-evident.
92
90 Johan van der Walt, "The Human Rights Debate in South Africa: A Historical and
Historicist Perspective", in Roel de Lange, Gerritt van Maanen and van der Walt,
eds., Human Rights and Property: A Bill of Rights in a Constitution for a New South
Africa (Ars Aequi Libri, 1993); Steven Mufson, "South Africa 1990", (1991) 70 Foreign
Affairs 121; Laurence Harris, "South Africa's Economic and Social Transformation:
From 'No Middle Road' to 'No Alternative'", (1993) 57 S. African Pol. Econ. 91, at 100.
91 Leo Katzen, "South Africa: Economy" in Africa South of the Sahara, (Europa Pub-
lications Ltd., 23rd ed., 1994).
92 Albie Sachs, "Towards a Bill of Rights for a Democratic South Africa", (1989) 12
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L.R. 289, at 294.
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In the Lampedusa-like words of one former security functionary:
"What we are trying to do is make sure that no future government has
the power we did".93 A bill of rights administered by the all-white South
African judiciary could be expected to protect the substance of the racist
power structure even while changing its form to a nominally democratic
one.
It is true that by the time Nelson Mandela was released from prison
the ANC had declared itself converted to the idea of constitutional
limitations on sovereignty; indeed, a constitutional bill of rights admin-
istered by an independent judiciary became the centrepiece of the
transfer of power to blacks through universal suffrage. While, in 1989,
Sachs eschewed judicial review and argued for a "democratic" Bill of
Rights to be administered by a non-judicial body under the model of the
human rights commission, in other words accountable to the majority,
his views underwent a radical change in a very short time. Two years
later he saw nothing wrong with a judicial bill of rights:
We must acknowledge, too, that although for our part we on the anti-
apartheid side have long stood almost alone in supporting the idea
of a democratic constitution based on universal franchise, only now
are many of us beginning to understand the full implications of
constitutionalism, and especially of an entrenched bill of rights.
Suddenly we are realizing that constitutionalism, far from being a
brake on democracy, offers the best chance of realizing the non-racial
ideals set out in the Freedom Charter.94
However, the resulting constitution, really a work in progress since
1994, is a far cry from the socialist action programme of the Freedom
Charter.95 In its 1997 version, the South African constitution is full of
vague and contradictory declarations of rights that at the same time
93 Steven Mufson, supra n. 90, at 137.
94 Albie Sachs,Advancing Human Rights in South Africa (Capetown, Oxford University
Press, 1992).
95 E.g., the Freedom Charter contained such proclamations as:
The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans, shall be
restored to the people.
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be
transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole...." in de Lange, van Maanen
and van der Walt, eds., supra n. 90, at 96.
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prevent, allow and enjoin the redistribution of economic power. 96 The
concrete meaning of these rights are left to be determined by a combi-
nation of the ordinary courts and a new Constitutional Court. Whites
are entirely in control of the ordinary courts.97 Even the Constitutional
Court retains a lopsided white, albeit liberal white, majorityf5 The legal
profession has an important, constitutionally designated nomination
role in the "Judicial Service Commission" where eight of twenty-three
members have to be lawyers, and government-linked appointees have
only a slight majority (perhaps twelve of twenty-three). Almost all
nominations for important judicial posts must come from this body.99 As
the legal profession evolves, the courts may change their colour but they
are unlikely to change their class composition. In the meantime, inter-
national economic pressure can be expected to be sufficient to keep the
ANC respectful of the guarantees of white economic power, the way even
isolated Zimbabwe has respected white minority guarantees many years
after their constitutional protection has expired. °0 In fact, at the same
time Nelson Mandela announced to the world's business leaders in
Davos Switzerland that there would be a judicially-enforced Bill of
Rights in the new South African constitution, he also announced that
96 See, for example, the complicated property section, Art. 25 which guarantees prop-
erty rights and 'just and equitable" compensation "approved by a court", in the
limited circumstances permitted for expropriation, which, however, include "the
nation's commitment to land reform". The same provision commits the state to "take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis".
97 Ziyad Motala, "Independence of the Judiciary, Prospects and Limitations of Judicial
Review in Terms of the United States Model in a New South African Legal Order:
Towards an Alternative Judicial Structure", (1991) 55 Albany L.R. 367, at 383, n. 117,
384-386.
98 See the Court's website <httpJ/sunsite.wits.ac.za/law/court/conjuris.html> for biog-
raphies of the judges. Albie Sachs is one of them. The tenure is a relatively long 12
years: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Art. 176.
99 Ibid., Art. 174.
100 Clement Ng'ong'ola, "The Post-Colonial Era in Relation to Land Expropriation Laws
in Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe", (1992) 41 Int'l Comp. L.Q. 117, at 134;
Ali A. Mazrui, "Planned Governance and the Liberal Revival in Africa: The Paradox
of Anticipation", (1992) 25 Cornell Int'l L.J. 541, at 548-549. Seven years after the
constitutional guarantees had expired, Zimbabwe had yet to act on its legal right to
redistribute land from the 4,000 white farmers who own half of the arable land to
the 8 million black farmers who live on the other half: International Herald Tribune,
January 24-25, 1998; February 16, 1998.
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no new investments after the suspension of sanctions would be nation-
alized and that South Africa would have a mixed economy with a public
sector no bigger than Western Europe. 101 The new constitution of South
Africa, then, seems to have been part of a programme to re-assure the
economic powers of the world that, despite all of the big changes, the
essentials would remain the same.
So, without pretending to have dealt with all the important consti-
tutional developments of this century, and leaving Israel apart for now,
a pretty strong case can be made for the anti-democratic thesis, to put
it mildly.
The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating
But even if we take it as established that modem constitutionalism
was inspired by a desire to change everything, constitutionally speak-
ing, so that everything, oligarchically speaking, would remain the same,
that does not mean that it actually did so. The best laid plans of jurists
and conservative politicians can gang just as agley as those of mice and
men. What has been the real effect of these anti-democratic constitu-
tions and the judicial review that stands guard over them? Taking
Dworkin's "result-driven" approach on its own terms, has constitutional
judicial review shown itself to be the "institutional structure ... best
calculated to produce the best answers to the ... question of what the
democratic conditions are, and to secure stable compliance with these
conditions?" What does the constitutional jurisprudence reveal?
Let us begin with the example familiar to everyone, the United States
of America. If the Supreme Court of the United States had a well-
deserved reputation for conservatism in the first half of the twentieth
century, it gained a new one for liberalism in the third quarter. After
a conservative post-war start with decisions upholding the McCarthy
period's fanatical persecution of the Left, 102 by the mid-fifties the Court
seemed to have turned over a completely new leaf. Under the leadership
of Earl Warren (a famous back-fire according to the President who
nominated him) the Supreme Court started on a path of liberalism
101 The Globe and Mail, 3 February 1992, p. Al.
102 American Communications Association v. Douds 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Dennis v.
United States 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
ISRAEL LAW REVIEW
unmatched in its history. In 1954 it ordered de-segregation of the
Southern schools;1° 3 in the 1960s it vastly expanded the rights of those
accused of crime with its broad interpretation of the "due process"
clause. 104 In 1973, a further expansive reading of the due process clause
decriminalized abortion, then a crime in almost every state of the
nation. 105
Taken by themselves, the decisions of this period had strong democ-
ratizing elements to them. The desegregation cases tended to enhance
the educational opportunities for black children and equalize them with
those of white children. The criminal procedure rights tended to give
resources to persons accused of crime, overwhelmingly poor and dispro-
portionately black. The abortion decisions tended to give women, espe-
cially poor women and, once again, disproportionately black women,
control over their child-bearing, which allowed them to delay parent-
hood and to increase their earning power and hence their autonomy.
However, these initiatives of the Supreme Court were all severely
limited in ways characteristic of modern constitutional politics. Be-
cause this "democratization" ignored discrimination on the basis of
class, it could have no effect on the major impediment to real, everyday
equality of power faced by most blacks and most women.
1°6
Public schools had to desegregate, but neighbourhoods and private
schools could still segregate by wealth, and this was far more important,
it turns out, than the colour barrier. Whites were able to avoid the
impact of the limited rulings of the Court by abandoning the new
integrated public schools in favour of private and suburban schools.
10 7
Those left in public schools were condemned to "drugs, gangs and crime,
while their scores on standardized achievement tests decline[d]. 0 8 The
economic barrier had replaced the colour barrier.
103 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
104 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
105 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
106 A 1998 report of the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation says that despite gains by
black elites, the mass of black people in the U.S. suffer from its increasing class
inequality: "The rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer and minorities
are suffering disproportionately" (International Herald Tribune, March 2, 1998, p. 3).
107 Raina Brubaker, "Missouri v. Jenkins: Widening the Mistakes ofMilliken v. Bradley",
(1996) 46 Case Western Reserve L.R. 579.
108 ArLynn Lieber Presser, "Broken Dreams", (May, 1991) Am. Bar Association J. 60.
According to the report of the Eisenhower Foundation, supra n. 106: "40 percent of
minority children attend urban schools, where more than half of the students are
poor and fail to reach even 'basic achievement levels'".
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For the same reason, the provision of due process rights in criminal
procedure made absolutely no difference to the rate of punishment in
the United States, as imprisonment rates skyrocketed and the racial
nature of punishment remained unchanged. Because it was poverty that
was the major factor in crime and punishment, not the fairness or unfair
trials.' ° 9 The only ones able to take advantage of the due process rules
were the powerful criminals: the corporate criminals, the racists and the
O.J. Simpsons." 0 As for the rest, by the beginning of this decade the
United States had the highest per capita prison population in the world
and imprisoned more black people per capita than apartheid South
Africa.
1 1'
The radical exclusion of questions of poverty from the constitutional
equation became explicit in the abortion jurisprudence when the Su-
preme Court, having forbidden the states from making abortion a crime,
approved of the denial of medicare for the now-legal procedure." 2 In
doing so, the Court was merely affirming the radical distinction between
political equality and economic inequality, between "public" and "pri-
vate". The state could not put up its own obstacles to women's equality,
but it was under no duty to intervene when economic power did. Adher-
ence to this distinction reached its absurd zenith when the Supreme
Court held that a state could deny all public facilities to women seeking
abortions without violating the constitution. 1 3 In 1992, Roe v. Wade was
more or less overruled altogether."
14
In fact, not very long after Roe v. Wade was originally decided, the
Supreme Court returned to its historic position on the right of the very
right-skewed spectrum of American politics. In 1976 it put its stamp of
approval on the death penalty, after calling it into question a few years
previous.1' 5 The United States now has the distinction of being the only
109 Mandel, supra n. 12, at 185-91.
110 Ibid., at 229-240.
111 Marc Mauer, "Americans Behind Bars - A Comparison of International Rates of
Incarceration", in Ward Churchill and J.J. Vander Wall, eds., Cages of Steel: The
Politics of Imprisonment in the United States, (Maisonneuve Press, 1992). "With 1.5
million prisoners, the United States incarcerates more people than any nation in the
world, and one young African-American man in three is in prison, on parole or on
probation". International Herald Tribune, March 2, 1998, p. 3.
112 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
113 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
114 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
115 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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country in the West to execute criminals. Blacks are about four times
over-represented on the various death rows, which now dispatch one
victim every five days, usually by lethal injection. 116 Naturally, they
have almost all had the fairest trials that judicial review can provide,
but what can be the role of due process in this context but legitimation,
that is to make us feel better about a system that in its violence and
inequality is getting worse all the time?117 In fact, it has been argued
that the main point of the otherwise ineffective desegregation decisions
of the 1950s was to legitimate the United States in the eyes of the world
of the Cold War on its most vulnerable point."8 Certainly the purvey-
ance on television of a violent and racist criminal justice system as
essentially humane on account of its "constitutional rights" is one of
America's most staple cultural exports.
But the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States has
not only ignored and legitimated inequality; it has entrenched and
enforced it. Probably the most important development came in 1976
when in the case of Buckley v. Valeo it struck down limits on election
campaign spending as a violation of the First Amendment guarantee of
"freedom of speech"." 9 The court equated "freedom" with the freedom of
the wealthy few to throw their economic weight around, "free" of any
democratic restraint. In other words it used "freedom" to protect the
freedom of "one dollar, one vote" from the threat of "one person, one
vote". The impact?
The electoral system in the United States is in severe crisis, a crisis
typified by low voter turnout, a narrow range of debate where sub-
stantive issues are studiously ignored, a degree of depoliticization
that makes perfect sense for such a vapid political culture. The
current system elevates people with no credentials, but vast inher-
ited fortunes, to almost automatic political prominence - like Steve
Forbes, Michael Huffington and U.S. Senator Herb Kohl to mention
116 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Blacks account for 1,349 of the 3,219
prisoners on death row. Of the 358 executions between 1977 and November 30, 1997,
200 were of black prisoners. In the first 11 months of 1997 there were 70 executions:
U.S. Department of Justice, "Prisoner Executions Rise Significantly", Press Release
of December 14, 1997. <httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/presscp96.pr>
117 Mandel, supra n. 12, at 220-228.
118 Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
(University of Chicago Press, 1991) at 156, 159.
119 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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just a few - while marginalizing dedicated citizens with lifetimes of
public service (but who refuse large contributions on principle) like
Ralph Nader. The cash-driven electoral system is not the only factor
that explains the decrepit state of U.S. politics, but it is among the
prime culprits.
In the hands of the wealthy, the advertisers and the corporate media,
the new-fangled First Amendment takes on an almost Orwellian
caste. It defends the right of the wealthy few to effectively control our
electoral system, thereby taking the risk out of democracy for the
rich, and making a farce of it for most everyone else.
120
Buckley remains an unquestioned fixture of American constitutional
jurisprudence, 121 but it is far from alone in its defence of inequality of
power against democracy. Another important contribution is the assault
on affirmative action that started with Bakke in 1978122 and continues
to this day.123 Here the court came to the defence of the accumulated
privileges of class, race and gender, which give enormous advantages in
the competition for scarce higher education and job opportunities, and
which thus tend to perpetuate themselves if left alone. Various legisla-
tures, responding to the logic of "one person, one vote" had intervened
"affirmatively" in the marketplace to break the vicious circle and share
out the available positions on a more equal basis. Candidates from
under-represented groups were preferred in order to help them reach a
proportion that reflected their demographic representation. This was
"reverse discrimination" because it was in favour of those who had
typically been discriminated against, most notably non-whites and
women.
120 Robert W. McChesney, "The New Theology of the First Amendment: Class Privilege
Over Democracy" (1998) 49 Monthly Review, No. 10, 17 at 19, 32.
121 Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee
(NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480 (1985); Geoffrey M. Wardle, "Time to Develop a Post-Buckley
Approach to Regulating the Contributions and Expenditures of Political Parties:
Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee",
(1996) 46 Case Western Reserve L.R. 603.
122 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
123 Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors Inc. v.
Federico Pena, Secretary of Transportation et al. 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995); Sionaidh
Douglas-Scott, "Affirmative Action in the U.S. Supreme Court: The Adarand Case
- The Final Chapter?", (1997) Public Law 43.
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But the court put its foot down: if the state could (no longer) intervene
against, it could not intervene in favour. The only permissible case was
where the intervention was to redress proven prior forbidden discrimi-
nation by the specific institution in question. According to the Court,
the pure discrimination of the marketplace was sacred. Here, as else-
where, the "tyranny of the majority" compared very favourably with
what the court served up:
The contemporary debate over judicial review is at a loss with respect
to consistent legislative protection of individual rights. The debate
accepts the simplistic view that majorities are always interested in
violating the rights of minorities. This makes it difficult to explain
why Congress is able to produce consistent majorities in favour of
civil rights and liberties legislation.124
So the United States Supreme Court, pretty much throughout its
history, has done its best to protect private power from the dangers of
democracy. It has not only respected the lines between public and
private, it has policed them. It has made democracy safe for the oligar-
chy of wealth. Its modest but much celebrated actions against official
discrimination should be seen merely as the logical expression of the
free market: all the sexual and racial equality you can buy. As for the
rest, a desperate attempt at the legitimation of inequality: due process
in a savage criminal justice system and equal access to a deteriorating
public sphere.
What about the constitutional jurisprudence of the rest of the world?
Is it possible to say anything meaningful about such a vast field, with
courts and lawyers producing jurisprudence in so many different lan-
guages at such a hair-raising pace? It turns out that the new prominence
of constitutional courts in scholarship and in the media, and even the
oppressive uniformity imposed by globalization, have made it possible
to go beyond one's own linguistic limitations (especially if English is one
of one's languages!) and, I believe, to make some broad judgments about
the democratic question in global constitutional politics.
Post-war constitutional jurisprudence has shown an unmistakeable
predilection for the defence of economic power against the threat of
democracy, mainly through the protection of private property rights and
the prerogatives of business. In Italy, for example, the Constitutional
124 Stephen M. Griffin, supra n. 55, at 116.
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Court weighed in almost immediately against the obligations imposed
on landowners with respect to employment that was a product of the
post-war involvement of the Communists in government. Its emphasis
on property and entrepreneurial rights also thwarted urban planning
and environmental regulation in the nineteen-sixties and seventies. The
Italian Constitutional Court also bears responsibility for the privatiza-
tion of public television and the growth of the unregulated mass media
empires of the nineteen-eighties (which inevitably became political
empires), even if the judges did try to lock the barn door well after the
horses had escaped with some totally ineffectual obiter statements in
the 1990S.125 The French Constitutional Council, after sleepily shoring
up the status quo during the Gaullist years, came to life against the first
Socialist government of the Fifth Republic. Composed mainly of judges
appointed by the previous rightist regime, it was very successful in
weighting down Mitterand's Socialist nationalization programme so
heavily with compensation payments that it ultimately had to be aban-
doned. 126 The German Court, in similar circumstances successfully fought
the reformist programs of the first post-war Social Democratic govern-
ments under Brandt and Schmidt. 127 In Canada, the Supreme Court of
Canada followed the lead of the Supreme Court of the United States and
used "freedom of expression" to entrench the fundamental human right
of tobacco companies to advertise their lethal products.1 28 And, though
the Supreme Court found "freedom of association" robust enough to
include the right of companies to merge,1 29 it looked and looked but could
not find any room for the right to collective bargaining, much less the
right to strike.130 Canadian courts have also ensured that through four
federal elections and one national referendum there have been no
controls on campaign spending because, following the inexorable one-
dollar-one-vote logic of Buckley, they struck them down as an interfer-
125 Michael Mandel, "Legal Politics Italian Style", in C. Neal Tate and TorbJorn Vallinder,
eds., The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York University Press, 1995)
261, at 268-272.
126 Alec Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in
Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press, 1992) Chapter 3; Alistair Cole,
Frangois Mitterand. A Study in Political Leadership (Routledge, 2nd ed., 1997) 34.
127 Alec Stone, "Judging Socialist Reform: The Politics of Coordinate Construction in
France and Germany", (1994) 26 Comp. Political Studies 443.
128 RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), (1995), 127 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
129 Black v. Law Society of Alberta (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 317.
130 Michael Mandel, supra n. 12, at 264-288.
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ence with "freedom of expression". The war between various Congress
governments and the Supreme Court of India over land reform is very
well documented.13 1 In Chile, the war was shorter but the outcome more
tragic as the Supreme Court systematically thwarted President Salvatore
Allende's attempts to socialize the economy. 3 2 In Mexico, despite an
abundance of "social rights" and a commitment to redistribute land in
the revolutionary constitution of 1917, the Supreme Court was able to
reverse the gains of the Cardenas era by extending amparo to large
landowners. A study of the Supreme Court's amparo decisions between
1917 and 1960 concluded that "Mexican judicial independence has
benefited primarily the old landholding class and the new bourgeois
interests ... corporate employers, financial institutions, and business-
men of urban Mexico". 133 Thus, despite a radical constitution and an
independent court, social and economic inequality in Mexico remains
huge and growing.134 Cuba, one of the very few countries without judicial
review in Latin America - the Constitution assigns enforcement of the
many rights in the constitution to the National Assembly 3 5 - fares
much better on social equality measures than any of its neighbours (and
its political rights record is at least no worse).1
36
This much-debated question of "social rights" in constitutions pro-
vides yet another taste of the pudding of modem constitutionalism.
These rights may seem at first sight to contradict the idea of constitu-
tions as being against democracy, because they seem to require the state
to act against the inequality of the marketplace. For instance, Article
3 of the Italian Constitution of 1948 provides in its second paragraph:
131 H.C.L. Merillat, Land and the Constitution of India (Columbia University Press,
1970); W.H. Morris-Jones, "The Politics of the Indian Constitution (1950)", in Vernon
Bogdanor, ed., Constitutions in Democratic Politics (Gower, 1988).
132 Neal P. Panish, "Chile Under Allende: The Decline of the Judiciary and the Rise of
a State of Necessity", (1987) 9 Loy. L. A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 693.
133 Carl Schwarz, "Judges Under the Shadow: Judicial Independence in the United
States and Mexico", (1973) 3 Calif. W. Intl L.J. 260.
134 Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman, The Course of Mexican History (Oxford
University Press, 1991); James W. Russell, "Mexico's Rising Inequality", (1997) 49
Monthly Review, No. 7, at 28.
135 Constitution of the Republic of Cuba 1976 (as amended), Art. 75(c).
136 Benjamin Keen, ed., Latin American Civilization: History and Society, 1492 to the'
Present, (Westview Press, 6th ed., 1996) 392; "Women's Equality in Cuba: What
Difference Does a Revolution Make?", (1986) 4 Law and Inequality 295; International
Herald Tribune, April 22, 1998, p. 1.
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It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an economic
or social nature that, limiting in fact the freedom and equality of
citizens, impede the full development of the human person and the
effective participation of all of the workers in the political, economic
and social organization of the nation.
This radical text and others like it were included thanks to the strong
presence of the Left in the Italian Constituent Assembly, and they were
written in terms as exigent as the classic rights against the state found
in liberal constitutions like that of the U.S.A. However, despite the text,
the Italian Constitutional Court quickly and permanently degraded
them to second class "programmatic" (i.e. unenforceable) status.137 The
Japanese Court used the same designation to demote the much milder
provisions in 1947 Constitution; 138 and the South African Court seems
to be on the same path, both against and in line with the wording of the
constitution. 139 The European Court of Justice did likewise, systemati-
cally reducing social rights against market power to "soft law" status.
Even worse, with very little textual support, it transformed the Treaty
of Rome into a free-trade constitution for Europe and created "a
transnational capitalist society". 40 The demotion of social rights in the
European Community has also become explicit, for example in the
137 Mandel, supra n. 24, at 272-276.
138 Akira Osuka, "Welfare Rights" in Percy R. Luney, Jr., and Kazuyuki Takahashi, eds.,
Japanese Constitutional Law, (University of Tokyo Press, 1993) 269. The general
passivity of the court, punctuated by the occasional defence of property rights, is
usually attributed to its seeing eye-to-eye with the conservative LDP governments
that have ruled Japan since the war. See Yasuhiro Okudaira, "Forty Years of the
Constitution and Its Various Influences: Japanese, American and European", ibid.,
at 24 and Mutsuo Nakamura, "Freedom of Economic Activities and the Right to
Property", ibid., at 255.
139 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), CCT 32/97 (Constitutional
Court, 26 November 1997), where the textually unqualified "right to life" was held
to be subject to available resources in a kidney dialysis case. The constitution also
explicitly makes many of the social rights subject to "reasonable legislative and other
measures, within ... available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this
right". The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, (sec. 27 - Health care,
food, water and social security).
140 Carlos A. Ball, "The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Society: The Court of
Justice, Social Policy, and Individual Rights Under the European Community's Legal
Order", (1996) 37 Harv. Int'l L.J. 307; Stephen Weatherill and Paul Beaumont, EC
Law (Penguin Books, 1993) 432.
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explicitly unenforceable "Solemn Declaration" of 1989 and the Social
Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. A similar demotion can be
found when comparing the judicial enforcement mechanism for the
European Convention on Human Rights with the reporting system of
the European Social Charter.
4 1
What can we make of these social rights and their uniformly second-
class status? In the first place, it cannot be repeated too often that there
is no technical reason why positive social rights in a constitution cannot
be judicially enforceable. An example is section 23 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms which, in great detail, imposes obliga-
tions on governments to provide minority language education facilities
at public expense, enforceable and enforced against Quebec's attempts
to make immigrants to the province enter the French educational sys-
tem. 142 Naturally, this was part of the Canadian federal government's
constitutional war against the independentist government of Quebec,
but that only shows what magic can be worked on constitutional law
when there is sufficient backing by powerful interests.
The Italian jurist Piero Calamandrei argued in 1950 that unenforce-
able constitutional social rights were essentially intended to deceive,
that the Left proposed them out of weakness and the Right accepted
them because it knew that they were harmless:
Thus to compensate the forces of the Left for the missed revolution,
the forces of the Right did not oppose the gathering up in the
constitution of a promised revolution ... well knowing that, once the
moment of crisis had passed, the reforming impulses would lose their
urgency, and, once they had ceased to boil, could remain in waiting
for another century (emphasis in original).
143
141 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1950) and European Social Charter (1950); David Harris, The European
Social Charter, (University Press of Virginia, 1988). Neither the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights nor the International Covenant on Economic and
Social Rights, administered by the United Nations, rises above unenforceable soft
law. See Benedetto Conforti, The Law and Practice of the United Nations (Kluwer,
1996) at 137-140.
142 Attorney General of Qudbec v. Quebec Protestant School Boards, (1984), 10 D.L.R.
(4th) 321 (Supreme Court of Canada).
143 Piero Calamandrei, "Cenni introduttivi sulla costituente e sui suoi lavori", in Norberto
Bobbio, ed., Piero Calamandrei, Scritti e discorsi politici, (La Nuova Italia, Vol. 2,
1966), 461-462 (my translation).
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The same explanation has been given for the "Solemn Declaration"
on Workers Rights of 1989 of the European Community, namely as a
costless way to appear to compensate the workers for the very concrete
and pro-business market integration of the European Single Act of
1987.1' In Canada, a generation of claims for the material wherewithal
to enable aboriginal communities to pull themselves out of their im-
posed poverty have been met with soft-law promises of every imaginable
sort from constitutions, courts and constitutional reform processes. 145 In
Mexico, the indigenous peoples asked "that the lands that were always
ours be given back to us" and demanded "electricity, roads, drinking
water" and "modern technologies indigenous peoples require to initiate
their economic and social development". Both before and even after the
discontent boiled over in the Chiapas rebellion, the Mexican govern-
ment was willing to offer only unenforceable constitutional recognitions
of the "pluricultural composition" of Mexico "originally based on its
indigenous peoples" and unacted-upon constitutional promises that "the
law shall protect and promote the development of their languages,
cultures, uses, customs, resources and specific forms of social organiza-
tion, and shall guarantee their members effective access to the jurisdic-
tion of the State".
146
Modern social democratic governments seem to have embraced soft
constitutional social rights as a way of deradicalizing their programmes
and legitimizing their failures to achieve anything concrete for their
supporters. The New Democratic Party government of Bob Rae in
Ontario abandoned its mildly socialist election platform under wither-
ing business opposition and instead jumped on a bandwagon of unen-
forceable social rights, with business' enthusiastic approval. 147 In Brit-
ain, Tony Blair's Labour government seems to have made its great
fanfare of adhering to the unenforceable Social Chapter of the Maastricht
Treaty for the same reason."18 This might also be a way of understanding
British Labour's largely symbolic incorporation of the European Con-
144 Stephen J. Silvia, "The Social Charter of the European Community: A Defeat for
European Labour", (1991) 44 Industrial and Labor Relations R. 626.
145 Mandel, supra n. 12, at 354-369.
146 Jorge A. Vargas, "Mexico's Legal Revolution: An Appraisal of Its Recent Constit i-
tional Changes, 1988-1995", (1996) 25 Ga. Int'l & Comp. L. 497, at 546-548. "Meriico
Gets Chiapas Bill," International Herald Tribune, March 17, 1998, p. 3.
147 Mandel, supra n. 12, at 109-112, 124-125.
148 Ewen MacAskill and Ian Black, "Cook Sets New Tone on Europe", The Guardian,
May 5, 1997.
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vention on Human Rights into English Law.149 Indeed, from Britain to
Canada to Mexico to South Africa to Italy,150 the world seems to be seized
by the disease of what Peter Russell has called "mega-constitutional-
ism",' 5 where constitutional reform becomes a way of life and every
aspiration for dignity and equality that is denied in concrete, everyday
practice by free-trading, globalizing governments is solemnly packed
into constitutional proposals "to remain in waiting for another century".
The motto of the modern constitutional reformers might well be "Say
the right thing!"
But let us return to the jurisprudence of the world. In the field of
politics, there has been a persistent tendency of constitutional courts to
protect the status quo of social power in crude and subtle ways: the
banning of the Communist party by the German Constitutional Court
in the 50s that was the start of a general war on the Left; 152 the Mexican
Court's amparo decisions against'radical labour leaders and student
protesters in the 60s;153 and the Chilean Supreme Court's stamp of
approval of the bloody Pinochet coup as a legal act to remove a "fla-
grantly illegitimate" government, followed by the refusal to entertain
appeals against the human rights abuses of the dictatorship-1 54 the
President of the Chilean Court, Enrique Urratia Manzano, wasn't kid-
ding when he placed the band of office on Pinochet and declared "I put
the judiciary in your hands". 55 For a generation now, the Canadian
Supreme Court has been battling the Quebec independence movement
with fair means and foul on behalf of English Canada and the federal
government that appoints it, changing its jurisprudence at will, from
hard-line when the independentists are in power in the province to soft-
line when federalists are in power. 56
149 See the Human Rights Bill [H.L.] 1998.
150 Commissione Bicamerale, Testo approvato il 4 novembre 1997: Progetto di Legge
Costituzionale.
151 Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey (University of Toronto Press, 1992).
152 Donald Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, (Duke University Press, 2nd ed., 1997), at 222-224.
153 Schwarz, supra n. 32.
154 Watson W. Galleher, "State Repression's Facade of Legality: The Military Courts in
Chile", (1988) 2 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 183.
155 Owen M. Fiss, "The Limits of Judicial Independence", (1993) 25 Inter-American L.R.
1, at 75.
156 Mandel, supra n. 12, at 127-176.
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But, really, have they done nothing right? Is this not altogether too
one-sided? It is true that, as in the United States, the world's constitu-
tional courts have been fairly good on the question of legal discrimina-
tion, especially against women. In the late 1960s the Italian Constitu-
tional Court started to dismantle the subordinate position of women in
Italian family law, although this was about a generation after equality
had been written into the constitution. The Italian Court also lead the
way in abortion rights. 5 7 On the other hand, the German Constitutional
Court notoriously dragged its feet on abortion and set back reform in
both 1975 and 1993.158 And, though the German Court set its face
against discrimination against women in nocturnal employment, it
must be said that this was at the instance of the employer who was
charged with the offence of hiring them.5 9 In Canada, women's equality
rights in sports, labour relations and taxation have divided women
themselves, often pitting individual women, not against men, but against
most other women. 160 In the same way, the pension and welfare equali-
zation undertaken by some courts, especially the Italian Constitutional
Court, has had a tendency to benefit one class of recipient only at the
expense of another, because the judgments never require a bigger
portion of the budget to be allocated to welfare than is hammered out
in political bargaining and Euro calculations.
16 1
Several constitutional courts have, like the United States Supreme
Court, even set up obstacles against affirmative action in favour of
women.'6 2 Both the Italian Constitutional Court and the French Consti-
tutional Council have opposed legislated quota for women candidates in
157 Mandel, supra n. 125, at 273.
158 Kommers, supra n. 152, at 335-356.
159 Ibid., at 291-295.
160 Mandel, supra n. 12, at 399-405, 443-452.
161 Mandel, supra n. 125, at 273. A recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court
struck down as "unreasonable" the exclusion of new couples with children from the
special list for access to public housing, which was formerly restricted to new couples
without children. The decision no doubt expanded the special list, but it did nothing
to increase "the limited availability of residential public housing which renders very
difficult, in concrete terms, its assignment to those who are only on the general list".
The gain of these couples would have to be at the expense of others similarly situated.
Sentenza 18 febbraio 1998, No. 17 Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica italiana, Anno
139 - Numero 8 at 18 (my translation).
162 The Indian Supreme Court opposed affirmative action in education as early as 1962:
W.H. Morris-Jones, supra n. 131, at 135.
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elections. 16 And the Canadian Court struck down the extra protection
given to women in rape trials as an interference with the rights of the
accused.16 It was regarded as a victory recently when the European
Court of Justice permitted affirmative action in Europe, reversing its
prior jurisprudence of just two years previous.'6 It seems to have been
forgotten that one does not need a Bill of Rights or a constitutional court
to uphold legislative action.
One did not need the German Constitutional Court or the European
Court of Human Rights to sustain the banning of Holocaust denier
David Irving'6 or to uphold the conviction of his colleague Robert
Faurisson,'6 7 but only a constitutional Bill of Rights could have allowed
the Supreme Court of Canada to free Ernst Zundel, one of the world's
great purveyors of Holocaust denial literature. In overturning his con-
viction by two juries, the court compared Zundel to Salman Rushdie and
said that, in Canada, freedom of expression guaranteed the right to tell
deliberate Nazi lies.
1"
The world's courts have also been excellent defenders of the proce-
dural rights of criminal accused and refugee applicants. But this has not
prevented prison populations from skyrocketing and the rich countries
from closing their borders. 69 The flimsiness of "rigid" constitutions has
especially been demonstrated in refugee law. After the constitutional
courts of Germany and France had found their summary measures for
expelling refugee applicants unconstitutional, their governments, with
the help of the Socialist opposition parties, easily found enough votes to
overcome the special majorities necessary to amend their constitutions
and reverse the holdings. The excuse was the rise in racist and even neo-
Nazi violence against immigrants - oh, the lessons of World War II!170
163 Corte costituzionale, Sentenza 12 settembre 1995, n. 422; Conseil costitutionnel,
decision no. 82-146, 18 November 1982 (reproduced in John Bell, French Constitu-
tional Law, (Oxford University Press, 1992) 349-352.
164 Mandel, supra n. 12, at 383-389.
165 "Women Win Job Ruling", Guardian Weekly, November 23, 1997.
166 Kommers, supra n. 152, at 382-387.
167 Faurisson v. France, (1996) 17 Human Rights L.J. 253.
168 Mandel, supra n. 12, at 369-376.
169 Mandel, supra n. 12, at 240-257; supra n. 125, at 276-279.
170 Kay Heilbronner, "The Concept of "Safe Country" and the Expeditious Asylum
Procedures: A Western European Perspective", (1993) 5 International Journal of
Refugee Law 46-48; Susan Soltesz, "Implications of the Conseil Costitutionnel's
Immigration and Asylum Decision of August 1993", (1995) 18 Boston College Int. &
Comp. L.R. 265; "Germany Turns Back Would-Be Refugees", The Globe and Mail,
July 2, 1993, p. 1.
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Democracy and Judicial Review in Theory:
Ronald Dworkin Tells a Lawyer's Joke
No doubt the hccount in the previous sections has been greatly over-
simplified. Because of time constraints, I have been unable to deal as
subtly as I would have liked with some of the more difficult questions,
to even address some questions at all, or to give potential counter-
examples the attention they deserve. But I think we can fairly proceed
on the assumption that the total historical and empirical picture of the
new constitutionalism is consistent with what has been described.
Now, given this historical and empirical reality, how could anyone
maintain that judicial review is "the essence of democracy"? Or, more
modestly, neither democratic nor undemocratic in itself? It seems that
there are only two logical possibilities: either one has to ignore historical
and empirical reality, or one has to re-define democracy to exclude
questions of economic power.
Ronald Dworkin does both. Despite his argument that the proof of the
pudding is in the eating, you will never find anything remotely resem-
bling an empirical investigation in his work. He seems far more inter-
ested in establishing a theoretical space where he can argue, in lawyer's
terms, about the correctness or incorrectness of constitutional cases
without having to worry about apologizing all the time for judicial
review as intrinsically undemocratic. His argument is, therefore, de-
voted to showing that it is not necessarily undemocratic just because it
overrules majority will. This seems like a modest objective, but, in
carrying it out, Dworkin takes on the monumental task of detaching
democracy from majority will altogether, once and for all. His failure is
equally monumental, however, and very clearly reveals precisely what
is wrong with the defence of judicial review as "not necessarily undemo-
cratic", not to mention "the essence of democracy".
Dworkin's position can be very briefly stated. Democracy, he argues,
is fundamentally about treating people as equals. If courts can do that
just as well as representative institutions elected by universal suffrage,
then it is irrelevant to their democratic character that, in doing so, they
overrule majority will. That is why the proof of the pudding is in the
eating.
But, wait just a minute! Why is it not a requirement of treating
people as equals that their opinions about equality are given equal
weight, as in "one person, one vote" (a.k.a. majority will)? When we
want to treat people as equals in any context you care to name, at home
ISRAEL LAW REVIEW
or on the Supreme Court of the United States, Canada or Israel, assum-
ing we can't reach a consensus, don't we put matters to a vote?'71 And,
besides, what would be the grounds for supposing - all the evidence to
the exact opposite apart - that a majority of judges could judge what
is required to treat people as equals better than a majority of the people
themselves?
Let's leave these questions for a moment and approach the question
the way Dworkin does. His conclusion that majoritarianism is not a
necessary ingredient of democracy is based on an argument as to what
democracy is fundamentally "about". He examines a number of hypoth-
eses, but the one that reveals the hole in his argument is equality of
political power. Remember how central this was in the debate about
democracy from Aristotle to the last century? Well, according to Dworkin,
the reason democracy has no necessary connection to majority rule (the
practical equivalent of "one person, one vote") is that it has no practical
value in equalizing political power. Why is that? Because it is economic
power that really counts:
... impact [Dworkin's proxy for power at this point in the argument]
is insensitive to what is the most important source of unequal politi-
cal power in modem democracies, which is the inequality of wealth
that allows some people vast opportunity to influence public opinion.
Ross Perot and I have only one vote each, but he can buy massive
television time to persuade others to his opinion, and I cannot buy
any. 172
Who can deny that, in modern America, a wildly unequal economic
power rules over politics like a despot? But can this be an argument
against the value of majority rule? Or is it merely the observation that
171 I remember well watching a clip from a Senate debate on Italian television shortly
after Giovanni Agnelli, the hereditary owner of FIAT, had been made Senator for
Life. Because of his enormous economic power, Agnelli has for the longest time been
a powerful force in Italian politics, to be courted by politicians at every opportunity.
But, at this moment in the Senate, when Senators were scrambling around in various
grouplets before an important vote, I remember being amazed (and, I confess,
delighted) to see how poor and forlorn Agnelli looked as he was virtually ignored by.
the experienced politicians. He had been effectively cut down to size in this forum
of one-person-one-vote, where his economic power was, for the time being, irrelevant.
172 Dworkin, supra n. 14, at 27.
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majority rule does not exist in the United States, that it has been
destroyed by economic power? In other words, can such inequality of
power really be a premise of democratic theory? Is it so inevitable? But
Dworkin has not given us the slightest reason why we should give up
the fight against economic inequality, why we should not try to turn
things around and re-assert the supremacy of "one person, one vote". In
fact, this is a throw-in-the-towel premise, none other than an example
of the phenomenon C.B. MacPherson identified of the re-definition of
democracy to make it safe for the economic oligarchs. It is not even that
far from the definition of democracy given by the supporters of Yeltsin's
"democratic coup": democracy = capitalist economics.
So Dworkin's conception of democracy seems to have made the classic
error of mistaking the "is" for the "ought", or at least for the possible.
He has mistaken the disease for health. He has taken the pathological
case of American democracy and treated it not only as the central case,
but the only possible case, leaving nothing for democracy but judicial
pronouncements. But, wait another minute! If we look under the rock
of judicial review, and return to the last section, we find that judicial
review is itself heavily implicated in this pathology of American democ-
racy. It was the Supreme of the United States, as a model for the other
constitutional courts around the world, that ruled it to be the essence
of democracy and freedom for the wealthy to be free to exercise their
economic power no matter what the rest of us voted. It was the Supreme
Court of the United States that struck down laws enacted by the
"tyrannical majority" to prevent the rich from bending representative
government to the will of one dollar, one vote. It was judicial review that
forbade controls on campaign spending as a violation of the Bill or
Rights and got us in this fix in the first place. Remember:
In the hands of the wealthy, the advertisers and the corporate media,
the new-fangled First Amendment takes on an almost Orwellian
caste. It defends the right of the wealthy few to effectively control our
electoral system, thereby taking the risk out of democracy for the
rich, and making a farce of it for most everyone else.
173
173 McChesney, supra n. 120, at 32.
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Or to put it in gattopardesco terms:
Extending the franchise increased democratization in the United
States; the escalating requirements of electoral finance ... have re-
versed this trend.
174
Question: What is the definition of chutzpa? Answer: The lawyer
acting for a person charged with murdering his parents who asks for
mercy on the ground that his client is an orphan. Next question: How
is this different from Dworkin's defence of judicial review on the ground
that majority rule is irrelevant because it is impotent against economic
power - when it is judicial review that made it so?
Dworkin thinks that Buckley was "unfortunate" and he laments "the
degeneration of democracy that has been so vivid in recent elections";
however, he thinks the solution is a matter of "develop[ing] a more
sophisticated view of what democracy means" for the judges to apply.
175
In fact the only "view" of democracy that would help us out of this mess
is the back-to-basics one of majority rule; at least this would have spared
us Buckley.
However, sometimes it seems that Dworkin's left hand doesn't know
what his right hand is doing, because not eight pages before telling us
Buckley was "unfortunate", he was demonstrating why it was pretty
well inevitable:
... constitutional interpretation is disciplined, under the moral read-
ing, by the requirement of constitutional integrity ... Judges may not
read their own convictions into the constitution. They may not read
the abstract moral clauses as expressing any particular moral judg-
ment, no matter how much that judgment appeals to them, unless
they find it consistent in principle with the structural design of the
Constitution as a whole, and also with the dominant lines of past
constitutional interpretation by other judges. ... Even a judge who
believes that abstract justice requires economic equality cannot in-
terpret the equal protection clause as making equality of wealth, or
collective ownership of productive resources, a constitutional re-
174 Edward S. Herman and Robert W. McChesney, The Global Media: The New Mission-
aries of Corporate Capitalism (Cassell, 1997) 147.
175 Dworkin, supra n. 14, at 18.
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quirement, because that interpretation simply does not fit American
history or practice, or the rest of the Constitution.. .The moral reading
asks them to find the best conception of constitutional moral princi-
ples-the best understanding of what equal moral status for men and
women really requires for example - that fits the broad story of
America's historical record.
176
This is a rich text. In it Dworkin shows how the deck ofjudicial review
is stacked in favour of economic power: Even a judge who believes that
abstract justice requires economic equality cannot interpret the equal
protection clause as making equality of wealth, or collective ownership
of productive resources, a constitutional requirement. Even if all the
judges believed it, even if it were demonstrably true that equality of
wealth and collective ownership were the best, the most just, the most
democratic of arrangements, the courts (not the legislatures) would be
unable to deliver it - according to their rules, they would have to go on
upholding the inequality of economic power, and the protection of that
power from majority will, because if there is one thing that fits the
"broad story of America's historical record" that's it. And notice that this
is not because of what is in the puny text of the constitution itself. The
text is only the tiniest fraction of the story. The main thing is a regur-
gitation of America's history and practice of inequality whatever the
constitution says. And here we have one of the major techniques of
constitutional democracy, another element of its anti-democracy, namely
its lack of transparency. Judges claim to be interpreting texts but they
are just giving us the status quo. Their "interpretation" of terms like
"equality" and "freedom" starts from hidden premises that take for
granted the unequal status quo of social power. Even if Dworkin
unrepentantly denies what everybody else affirms, that the constitution
is what individual judges say it is, he does not dispute that it is what
the judiciary as a whole says it is. And who is better suited to "interpret"
the constitution and democracy in a way congenial to oligarchy than the
judiciary, aided by the legal profession, together forming an elite body
that would be able to vote under the most property-restricted franchise
imaginable? A body, as Pashukanis pointed out many years ago, that is
176 Dworkin, supra n. 14, at 10-11.
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independent of the state but not independent of the propertied classes. 177
Here, perhaps, we have the theoretical basis of the old maxim "Revolu-
tions are not fought in the court room!"
78
So judicial review's record of anti-democratic behaviour is no accident
and those who chose judicial review as an antidote to democracy chose
well. This is one place where history, practice and theory fit each other
like a glove.
177 Evgeny B. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism:A General Theory, (Pluto Press, 1989) 149,
n. 21.
178 Attributed to Maximilien Harden (1861-1927) by Eyck, supra n. 23, Vol. II at 416.
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